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NOTES
MARKETABLE TITLE ACT FOR NEW MEXICO
One of the eminent authorities in the field of real property law,
said in 1958:
The complexity, delay and expense in land title transactions in the
United States generally are so serious as to warrant drastic remedial
measures. The difficulties that prevail today, in the absence of corrective measures, are bound to grow worse as time passes.'
In 1960, Professor Lewis M. Simes of the University of Michigan
opened his discussion of major remedies available to improve conveyancing by legislation with these words:
No other remedial legislation which has been enacted or proposed
in recent years for the improvement of conveyancing offers as much
as the marketable title act. It may be regarded as the keystone in the
arch which2 constitutes the structure of a modernized system of conveyancing.
Today, thirteen states have passed legislation which can be characterized as "marketable title acts." The first state to do so was
Iowa, whose legislation was adopted in 1919. Both Florida and
Utah, the states most recently adopting marketable title acts, acted
in 1963. In view of the widespread adoption, and strong recom1. Aigler, Marketable Title Acts, 13 U. Miami L. Rev., 47, 61(1958).
2. Simes & Taylor, Improvement of Conveyancing by Legislation, 3 (1960) [herein after cited as Simes & Taylor]. This treatise was prepared for the Section of Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar Association and the University of Michigan Law School.
3. The states which have adopted marketable title acts through 1964 are listed in
Basye, Clearing Land Titles, §§ 172-84 (1953, Supp. 1964). States adopting a marketable
title act, in chronological order, are: Iowa, 1919, Iowa Code Ann. §§ 614.17-20 (1946,
Supp. 1965) ; Illinois, 1941, Il. Ann. Stat. ch. 83, §§ 12.1-4 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1965)
Indiana, 1941 (the 1941 act was repealed in 1963; a new act was adopted in 1963)
Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 56-1101 to -1110 (Supp. 1965) ; Wisconsin, 1941, Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 330.15 (1958) ; Minnesota, 1943, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 541.023 (Supp. 1965) ; Michigan,
1945, Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 26.1271-.1279 (1953, Supp. 1965) ; South Dakota, 1947, S.D.
Code §§ 51.16B01-.16B14 (Supp. 1960) ; Nebraska, 1947, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 76-288 to
-298 (Repl. 1958) ; North Dakota, 1951, N.D. Cent. Code §§47-19A-01 to -11 (1960) ;
Ohio, 1961, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 5301.47-.56 (Page Supp. 1965) ; Oklahoma, 1961,
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 16 § 71-81 (Supp. 1965) ; Florida, 1963, Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 712.01.10 (Supp. 1964) ; Utah, 1963, Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-9-1 to -10 (1953, Supp. 1965).

JULY, 19661

NO TES

mendations for such legislation by numerous authorities,4 it is appropriate that New Mexico give serious consideration to passage
of an act suitable for its needs and amenable to its established
policy and law. With minor changes, the Model Marketable Title
Act' is acceptable and recommended. A presentation of the general
characteristics of the act, its probable benefits in its application to
New Mexico circumstances, and the need for some minor changes
is the purpose of this Note.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MARKETABLE TITLE ACTS

In concept, marketable title legislation provides that an owner
whose chain of record title is clear for a specified number of years
shall be protected in his ownership against all conflicting and inconsistent claims arising from title transactions which occurred prior
to the stated period. The acts passed, and the Model Act, provide
that conflicting claims shall be (with some exceptions to be set out
later) automatically extinguished, unless the holder of the claim
files or records a notice of claim. To accomplish this objective, the
acts necessarily combine the features of "curative acts," "recording
acts," and "statutes of limitation into one statute."" This combination has been judicially set forth by the Minnesota Supreme Court
in what is perhaps the landmark case in the field of marketable title
acts, Wichelman v. Messner :'
The Marketable Title Act is a comprehensive plan for reform in
conveyancing procedures and encompasses within its provisions the
collective sanctions of (a) a curative act, (b) a recording act, and
(c) a statute of limitations. It is a curative act in that it may operate

to correct certain defects which have arisen in the execution of instruments in the chain of title. It is a recording act in that it requires
4. E.g., Aigler, supra note 1; Basye, Trends and Progress-The Marketable Title
Acts, 47 Iowa L. Rev. 261 (1962) ; Cribbet, Conveyancing Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
1291 (1960) ; Webster, The Quest for Clear Land Titles, 44 N.C.L. Rev. 89 (1965).
5. Simes & Taylor 6-10.
6. Webster, supra note 4, at 100.
7. 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957). This most interesting case utilized the
services of over sixty lawyers as amici curiae. The lawyers selected to participate
came from most parts of the state. The matter had once been decided, but motion for
rehearing was granted, the opinion was withdrawn, and the substituted opinion is cited
here. The substituted opinion affirmed the original decision, but adds considerably
to considerations of constitutionality. See Comment, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 232 (1956) for
a discussion of the original opinion.
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notice to be given to the public of the existence of conditions and

restrictions which may be vested or contingent, growing out of
ancient records which fetter the marketability of title (see, Klasen
v. Thompson, 189 Minn. 254, 248 N.W. 817). It is as well a statute
of limitations in that the filing of a notice is a prerequisite to preserve
a right of action to enforce any right, claim, or interest in real estate
founded upon any instrument, event, or transaction which was executed or occurred more than 40 years prior to the commencement
of the action, whether such claim or interest is mature or immature
and whether it is vested or contingent.8

It is not to be supposed, however, that the act is one of absolute
limitation which will require abstracts of title only for the statutory
period. The title examiner does not have to consider the vast majority of ancient mortgages, servitudes, easements, title by adverse
possession, and interests which are equitable as well as legal, future
as well as present. But there are a number of exceptions in the act
which will require review of instruments back to the sovereign to
determine if such exceptions exist.'
Generally, the acts have been designed to shorten and make
more certain the examination of title. No assurance as to "marketability of title" in a judicial sense is given-the title may still be
subject to defects arising from exceptions to the statute prior to the
period, or, of course, from defects which have arisen subsequent
to the beginning of the period. Nevertheless, in a practical sense,
the title examiner who fears most not the courts, but the adverse
decision of an over-meticulous "fly-specker" who has as a client,
perhaps, a buyer who has changed his mind about fulfilling the
8. Wichelman v. Messner, supra note 7, at 106-07, 83 N.W.2d at 816 (1957).
9. Undoubtedly the limitation of the length of abstracts is a desirable goal in
conveyancing, but so long as tracing to the sovereign is an essential part of the concept of title, abstracts will become inexorably longer. The failure of the marketable
title acts to attack this problem directly has been characterized as "unfavorable" by
a Wisconsin attorney who said:
On the unfavorable side, the statute has failed and accomplished nothing
in the simplification or shortening of (a) examinations by abstractors of record
titles or (b) abstracts of title, or in the reduction of costs of such examinations and a abstracts. Abstracts have not been simplified, or shortened. In
fact, the trend seems to be in the other direction. Cfr. Ch. 553, Laws of 1955.
Abstracts are becoming more and more costly and will eventually price themselves out of the market. In view of the number of abstracts prepared and
needed in the state of Wisconsin this is a most serious failure from both a
social and economic standpoint.
Dede, Marketable Title Statute in Wisconsin, Wis. Bar Bull., Apr. 1956, p. 9.
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terms of his contract, can be assured that the greater part of available "fly-specks" have been eliminated. In effect a statutory standard of title examination has been established, at least in part, and
the examiner can be assured that all are working under the same
rules.
II

THE SITUATION IN NEW MEXICO

It is probable that within the memories of title examiners now
living in New Mexico numerous counties' records were so small
in number that an examiner could become sufficiently familiar with
them all to make a reasonably reliable search in a short time from
the record itself. But the burgeoning population and the concomitant increase in records have generally made such an ideal situation
a by-gone thing. Of interest might be the estimates made of instruments filed in the office of the County Clerk in Bernalillo County,
based upon reception numbers examined. In 1925, approximately
5,800 instruments were filed; in 1935 about 7,200; in 1945 about
17,000; and in 1965 about 100,000.10 Although daily recordings
in 1966 indicate a reduction (based upon an estimate of 200 to
250 per day), the 1966 total will be approximately 75,000 instruments."
It cannot be reasonably inferred, however, that this fourteenfold increase in title transactions between 1935 and 1965 has
brought about a corresponding increase in title examinations. The
growth of title insurance has resulted in a substantial reduction in
the number of buyers who insist upon title examination at the time
of their purchase. Perhaps this growth of title insurance can be
interpreted as strong objection by society to uncertainty and expense
of title examinations. If so, the need to streamline and make more
certain the benefits of title examination is being forced upon the
legal profession in New Mexico by the economic pressure of competition.
10. Approximately 64,000 of the 100,000 filings in 1965 were mortgages and deeds.
Admittedly there are some duplications in using reception numbers as a basis for
count, but the error is small and the approximations so achieved are very near to the
true figures.
11. It would not be mathematically appropriate to extrapolate these figures to make
estimates for the other counties of New Mexico because Albuquerque and Bernalillo
County have been the centers of the greatest growth.
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Although most authorities in the area of conveyancing recommend the installation of tract indexes' 2 in addition to traditional
grantor-grantee indexes, New Mexico officially has no such system.
However, a long step forward was taken in 1963 when the legislature provided that all licensed abstractors must furnish themselves with such tract indexes.'" In larger cities, where more than
one abstractor is in business, each at present maintains his own index, and such a duplication is undoubtedly economically wasteful.
However, the almost prohibitive cost to small counties probably
prevented the establishment of official indexes, the current system
is certainly an advance in the title area. The acceptance of a twentyyear period for such tract indexes is of interest. Although provisions are made for new abstractors to enter business with an index
covering twenty years from the date they begin work, it seems that
the entry of new abstractors into the field will be highly unlikely.
The most probable effect of the statute will be to freeze abstractors
to those who had an index at the time of the act's passage, thereby
insuring that abstractors possess tract indexes back to July 1, 1943,'4
which would cover the
period of the "explosion" in title transac5
tions in New Mexico.'
Perhaps more important in considering the advisability of a
marketable title act for New Mexico than the factual circumstances,
is a look at the policy of the people of the state as evidenced by
statutes, court opinions, and title standards. Can it be determined
whether that policy favors a rigid and formal protection of property interests, or does it favor protection of the interests of the
ostensible owner, the possessor, or the user even to the extent of
extinguishing certain conflicting interests? Surely it is the latter
policy which is most in evidence.
Early in the history of the New Mexico Territory, strong support was given to the idea that the possessor should be confirmed
in title to his land, by passage of what is now section 23-1-21 of
the New Mexico statutes.' 6 Under this statute, one who possessed
12. E.g., Basye, op. cit. supra note 3, § 6; Fairchild, Improvement in Recording
and Indexing Methods for Real Property Instruments, 28 Geo. L.J. 307 (1939) ; Cross,
Weaknesses of the Present Recording System, 47 Iowa L. Rev. 245 (1961).
13. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 70-2-8 (Supp. 1965).
14. N.M. Star. Ann. § 70-2-8 (Supp. 1965) requires that: "The abstract plant shall
cover the period from twenty [20] years prior to July 1, 1963, or twenty [20] years
prior to the date the abstractor commences business, whichever is later, up to date."
15. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
16. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-21 (1953). The original act, enacted in 1858, was substantially the same as the present statute.
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land with a color of title in certain grants for ten years was to be
confirmed in his ownership. In interpreting this statute, the New
Mexico Supreme Court has spoken of the possession required as
being adverse, although the statute itself speaks only in terms of
"possession." Professor Verle R. Seed contends that such reference
to "adverse" possession by the occupying claimant "seems to mean
only that the possession be intended to result ultimately in fee simple
title in the occupant."' 17 The court has further said that the purpose
of the act was to provide "legal protection not only from fictitious
claimants, but from claimants who had long slept upon their rights
as well."' 1 8 The statute, as well as the 1911 statement by the court,
are surely strong support for the extinguishment of "sleeping"
claims of interest, inconsistent with those of the ostensible owner
and possessor. Numerous other decisions"9 and legislative acts 2"
confirm that the possessor or ostensible owner is to be favored in
New Mexico.
Because title examiners will be especially benefited by the marketable title acts, their attitude toward ancient claims of interest is
most significant. The Standards of Title Examination recently
adopted by the Title Standards Committee of the New Mexico Bar
Association forthrightly accept the position that many errors and
claims more than fifty years old should be disregarded. Standard
No. 18 states:
Examination of instruments more than fifty years old should be
made only for the purpose of determining that title has passed from
the sovereign; that there are conveyances or other instruments of record which reasonably evidence an intent to transfer interest of record
owners (without regard to whether such instruments are actually
sufficient to convey title) and to ascertain whether or not there
exists any "future interests" which may not have yet vested or may
have vested within the last fifty years. It is intended by this standard
17. Seed, Adverse Possession in Ne'w Mexico, 4 Natural Resources J. 559, 570
(1965).
18. Montoya v. Heirs, 16 N.M. 349, 379, 120 Pac. 676, 687 (1911), aff'd, 232 U.S.
375 (1914).
19. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Town of Tome, 23 N.M. 255, 167 Pac. 733 (1917)
Metzger v. Ellis, 65 N.M. 347, 337 P.2d 609 (1959).
20. Of special significance in addition to N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-21 (1953), is the
group of statutes designed to bar ancient mortgages, §§ 23-1-3, -16, -20, and § 22-14-1.
Under these statutes a mortgagee is barred from defending against suit brought to
remove the mortgage from record of title if it is six years or more overdue. Professor
Basye considers this to be "a fairly effective, albeit unusual, measure. . . ." Basye,
op. cit. supra note 3, § 109 (Supp. 1964).
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to disregard all errors in description; to disregard all questions of

jurisdiction in probate and mortgage foreclosures proceedings; to accept conveyances purporting to be from all of the heirs of the decedent without probate proceedings or any proceeding to determine
heirship; and all other similar discrepancies so long as it reasonably
appears 21that there was an intent to convey the interest of recorded
owners.

The standards set out numerous admonitions to the title examiner,
generally tending to seek the establishment of good title, rather
than "fly-specking" to find an unmarketable or marginal title. The

doctrine of idem sonans is to be applied liberally, 22 recognition is to
be given to the English equivalents of Spanish names, and vice
versa, and the frequent employment of diminutives for Spanish
names should be noted; 23 variance in names should not generally
be objectionable ;24 mechanics liens and judgments barred by appropriate limitation should not be treated as encumbrances or clouds
on title ;25 and errors and irregularities in descriptions should be considered in the light of lapsed time, subsequent conveyances, and the
like, so that approval can be given to marginally sufficient or questionable descriptions.
In truth, the scope of these standards seems to provide an adequate alternative to the passage of marketable title legislation. Unfortunately, although courts generally give great weight to the
practices and standards of title examiners, they do not have the
dominating effect of statutory pronouncement, nor can their enforcement throughout the profession be completely assured. 26 But
the standards are a distinct aid to the imposition in practice of the
21. N.M. State Bar, Standards of Title Examination, Vol. 10, Pt. 2, N.M. Stat.
Ann. 1, 3-4 (Supp. 1965).
22. Id. at 1. The doctrine of idem sonans is concerned with the pronunciation and
spelling of names.

23. Id. at 1.
24. Id. at 1.
25. Id. at 3.
26. That the title standards as adopted have the overwhemling support of the
New Mexico Bar is demonstrated by replies to the Membership Attitude Questionnaire of the State Bar of N.M., October, 1965. Of 242 attorneys who replied to the
question concerning the value of the adoption of title standards, 122 found them to be
"very helpful," 89 "worthwhile," 13 had no comment, but 9 found them to be "not
helpful," and 9 considered revision necessary. The existence of the 18 dissidents is,
however, a threat to the conscientious title examiner who can never be sure that his
opinion will not be challenged by a dissenter. Unanimity in application of standards
would be assured under statute; unanimity is only highly probable under the
standards.
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principle that title transfers should be simple and economical, and
demonstrate clearly that the passage of marketable title acts would
not be a serious disruption of present title practices.
III
THE MODEL MARKETABLE TITLE ACT

The Model Act is not a promulgation of the American Bar Association, but is rather the full responsibility of Professors Lewis
M. Simes and Clarence B. Taylor of the University of Michigan.
The act, together with a number of other model acts relating to the
improvement of conveyancing, was prepared under the guidance
and at the urging of the Committee on Improvement of Conveyancing and Recording Practices of the Section on Real Property,
Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar Association. 2 The
Model Act is set out below, section by section with comments regarding possible changes.
Section 1. MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE.
Any person having the legal capacity to own land in
this state, who has an unbroken chain of title record to
any interest in land for forty years or more, shall be
deemed to have a marketable record title to such interest
as defined in Section 8, subject only to the matters stated
in Section 2 hereof. A person shall be deemed to have
such an unbroken chain of title when the official public records disclose a conveyance or other title transaction, of
record not less than forty years at the time the marketa-

bility is to be determined, which said conveyance or other
title transaction purports to create such interest, either in
a) the person claiming such interest, or
b) some other person from whom, by one or more conveyances or other title transactions of record, such
purported interest has become vested in the person
claiming such interest;
with nothing appearing of record, in either case, purporting to divest such claimant of such purported interest.
27. Simes & Taylor at xiii.
28. Simes & Taylor at xi. The text of the Marketable Title Act is taken from
Simes & Taylor 6-10.
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It is important to note that the statutory period is described as

"not less than forty years." Generally, of course, this period will
be somewhat more than forty years, as the instrument under which
one claims title will only by an unusual coincidence be recorded
precisely forty years back. It is the first recorded instrument conveying title that is at least forty years old which will be the claimant's
"root of title" (more precisely defined in section 8(e) infra). To
demonstrate a chain of the title of at least forty years, the claimant
must go to this "root of title" and it is entirely possible that the
first recorded title conveyance older than forty years is sixty or
even seventy years prior, and no intervening record exists.
The period of forty years is a somewhat arbitrary selection,
consonant with the policy, made necessary by law. States which
have adopted the marketable title acts vary considerably in the
selection of this period, choosing a period from nineteen to seventyfive years. 29 The most recent statutes enacted, Florida and Utah,
provide for periods of thirty and forty years respectively."0 The
period of forty years is deemed most suitable for New Mexico.
Experience has indicated in other states that the number of notices
of claims recordable under section 2(b) of the act, infra, has been
very small with a forty-year term. 1 On the other hand, a shorter
term may serve to extinguish future interests, mortgages, and easements which have substantial value that would in the ordinary course
of events become insubstantial if the forty year period were adopted.
In New Mexico, the supreme court has stated that the forfeiture
of easements is not favored ;32 to enable a legislative policy to prevail over this stated objective, the longer period would be necessary. Additionally, the forty-year period well covers the "explosion"
in recorded instruments, and would lend a more reasonable length
of validity to restrictive covenants affecting developments which
took place in the late 1940's and 1950's.
Section 2. MATTERS TO WHICH MARKETABLE
TITLE IS SUBJECT.
Such marketable record title shall be subject to:
a) All interests and defects which are inherent in the
muniments of which such chain of record title is formed;
29.
30.
31.
32.

Simes & Taylor 355.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 712.02 (Supp. 1964) ; Utah Code Ann. § 57-9-1 (1953).
Simes & Taylor 355.
Alamogordo Improvement Co. v. Prendergast, 43 N.M. 245, 91 P.2d 428 (1939).
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provided, however, that a general reference in such muniments, or any of them, to easements, use restrictions or
other interests created prior to the root of title shall not
be sufficient to preserve them, unless specific identification
be made therein of a recorded title transaction which creates such easement, use restriction or other interest.
b) All interests preserved by the filing of proper notice
or by possession by the same owner continuously for a
period of forty years or more, in accordance with Section 4 hereof.
c) The rights of any persons arising from a period of
adverse possession or user, which was in whole or in part
subsequent to the effective date of the root of title.
d) Any interest arising out of a title transaction which
has been recorded subsequent to the effective date of the
root of title from which the unbroken chain of title of
record is started; provided, however, that such recording
shall not revive or give validity to any interest which has
been extinguished prior to the time of the recording by the
operation of Section 3 hereof.
e) The exceptions stated in Section 6 hereof as to rights
of reversioners in leases, as to apparent easements and interests in the nature of easements, and as to interests of
the United States.
This section, one of the most critical sections of the act, is necessary to accommodate the act to constitutionality and firm law; if
the act is to be effective, these exceptions must be provided as the
absolute minimum. It is believed that the provisions of the Model
Act are appropriate for New Mexico as drafted.
Clause (a) provides that if no subsequent conveyances older
than forty years are on record, all interests and defects in the first
instrument prior to forty years are not extinguished, no matter how
far back of forty years the claimant must go to secure a "root of
title." For example, if J conveys to B in 1900 with a possibility
of reverter indicated by the words "so long as the land is used for
residence purposes," and there are no intervening conveyances free
of such restriction between 1900 and 1926, under an act passed in
1966 with a forty-year statutory period, the possibility of reverter
is still an effective interest. The first conveyance at least 40 years
old must be contained in the claimant's chain of title, and, under
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clause (a) of section 2, remains effective so long as it is necessary
to include that instrument as the root or commencement of the
chain.
The provision of general reference is at least consonant with
the legislative philosophy contained in section 70-1-44 of the New
Mexico statutes8 3 which provides that a description by reference
must show sufficient information to identify and locate the recorded
instrument to which reference is made. Because of the existence of
this statute, however, it would be advisable to modify the language
of clause (a) to accord with the New Mexico statute in order to
avoid possible inconsistencies in construction. The recommended
change, shown below in italics, would cause clause (a) to read:
(a) All interests and defects which are inherent in the
muniments of which such chain of record title is formed;
provided, however, that a general reference in such muniments, or any of them, to easements, use restrictions or
other interests created prior to the root of title shall not
be sufficient to preserve them, unless such reference shall
show the time and place of filing or recordationof the instrument wherein such easement, use restriction or other
interest is clearly set forth, or other similar information,
so that the instrument referred to can be located and
identified.
Clause (b) of section 2 operates to preserve any estate or interest that is re-recorded in accordance with sections 4 and 5, for a
new period of forty years, and to establish continuous possession
for forty years as equivalent to notice of preservation of interest
(more fully discussed under section 4 (c) infra).
Clause (c) tackles an extremely difficult problem. It can be hypothesized that an adverse possessor had occupied the land and
matured his adverse title within the forty-year period, and that the
present claimant has neither notice, nor any indication upon the
record of the matured claim. The title examiner could then never
be sure that no claim existed until he was certain of a complete
absence of hostile possession for the forty-year period. In most
cases this would be impractical or impossible. However, under the
second of New Mexico's adverse possession laws, section 23-1-22,
the requirement is made that the person claiming title by adverse
33.

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 70-1-44 (Repl. 1961).
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possession must have paid taxes for the ten-year period.34 To assure himself that there exists no validly matured claim of adverse
possession, a title examiner can depend upon a review of the tax
records. If, during the period from the date of root of title to the
present, no person outside the record chain of title has paid taxes
for a period of at least ten consecutive years, the examiner can be
certain that no valid claim exists under section 23-1-22. But this
certainty disappears under the terms of the first of New Mexico's
title by possession statutes, section 23-1-21, because the payment
of taxes is not an essential element to the maturing of titles. 35 Unless the examiner can then establish, outside the record, that there
has been a complete absence of possession by any person except
those in the chain of record title, he can never be absolutely certain
that a claim under section 23-1-21 does not exist. It seems that the
solution is to "cut the Gordian knot" and repeal the statute. The
purpose of the original act, as stated by the New Mexico Supreme
Court in Montoya v. Heirs,"' was to protect those "settlers and
occupiers [who] had defended the soil and the people occupying it
from the incursions of the Indians." ' 37 The need for such protection
has long passed. Section 23-1-21 is now an anachronism which
merely serves to fetter the marketability of titles in New Mexico,
and the protection of possessors can be adequately accomplished
under the second, or true adverse possession statute. 8 Although
other solutions have been suggested, 9 the retention of the clause
as it is in the Model Act, when combined with repeal of section
23-1-21 of the New Mexico statutes, would be appropriate.
Clause (d) is included to provide for circumstances where there
exist two independent record chains of title, one of which results in
a purported conveyance being recorded during the forty-year period.
Professors Simes and Taylor illustrate clause (d) as follows:4"
34. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-22 (1953) Seed, supra note 17, at 580.
35. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-21 (1953) ; Seed, supra note 17, at 567.
36. Montoya v. Heirs, 16 N.M. 349, 120 Pac. 676 (1911), aff'd, 232 U.S. 375 (1914).
37. Montoya v. Heirs, supra note 36, at 379, 120 Pac. at 687.
38. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-22 (1953).
39. Webster, supra note 4, at 106. Professor Webster has recommended that North
Carolina adopt a clause which reads, " * * (c) Rights of any person who is in present,
actual and open possession of lands so long as such person is in such possession." This
would extinguish (unless notice be filed) any title dependent upon the maturing of
adverse possession qualifications. In New Mexico this would seem unnecessary and
might promote "claim-jumping" on temporarily vacant property. This type of person
has been described as a "late squatting possessor." Boyer & Shapo, Florida'sMarketable
Title Act, 18 U. Miami L. Rev. 103, 118 (1963).
40. Simes & Taylor 13-14.
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Suppose a deed conveying land from A to B in fee simple is recorded
in 1912. A second deed conveying the same land from B to C in fee
simple is recorded in 1925. In 1915 a deed conveying the same land
from X to Y in fee simple is recorded. In 1955, Y may be said to have
a marketable record title under the statute, since 40 years has elapsed
after the effective date of his root of title, 1915. And the 1925 conveyance from B to C cannot be said to purport to divest Y, since it
is an entirely independent chain of title. Nevertheless, by the terms
of this clause, Y takes subject to the interest of C arising from the
deed recorded in 1925. It will be noted, therefore, that the recording of C's deed in 1925 operated in much the same way as if he had
filed a notice, and prevented Y from wiping out C's title in 1955.
Suppose, however, that a conveyance from A to B in fee simple is
recorded in 1912 and then a conveyance from B to C in fee simple
is recorded in 1957. Another chain of title consists in a conveyance
in fee simple from X to Y, recorded in 1915. In 1955 Y has a marketable title under the statute; and this wipes out B's interest at
that time. Therefore, in accordance with the proviso in clause (d),
B's interest, which was once extinguished, is not revived, and Y's
title is not subject to it. It is true, we can say that in a sense Y's
title is subject to a conveyance from B to C, but this conveyance
has merely the force of a wild deed, and does not carry any interest
to C.

Clause (e) can be best discussed under section 6, infra, as the
clause itself indicates.
Section 3. INTERESTS EXTINGUISHED BY MARKETABLE TITLE.
Subject to the matters stated in Section 2 hereof, such
marketable record title shall be held by its owner and
shall be held by its owner and shall be taken by any person
dealing with the land free and clear of all interests, claims
or charges whatsoever, the existence of which depends
upon any act, transaction, event or omission that occurred
prior to the effective date of the root of title. All such
interests, claims or charges, however denominated,
whether legal or equitable, present or future, whether such
interests, claims or charges are asserted by a person sui
juris or under a disability, whether such person is within
or without the state, whether such person is natural or
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corporate, or is private or governmental, are hereby declared to be null and void.
Section 4. EFFECT OF FILING NOTICE OR THE
EQUIVALENT.
(a) Any person claiming an interest in land may preserve and keep effective such interest by filing for record
during the forty-year period immediately following the
effective date of the root of title of the person whose record title would otherwise be marketable, a notice in
writing, duly verified by oath, setting forth the nature
of the claim. No disability or lack of knowledge of any
kind on the part of anyone shall suspend the running of
said forty-year period. Such notice may be filed for record
by the claimant or by any other person acting on behalf
of any claimant who is
(1) under a disability,
(2) unable to assert a claim on his own behalf, or
(3) one of a class, but whose identity cannot be established or is uncertain at the time of filing such
notice of claim for record.
(b) If the same record owner of any possessory interest in land has been in possession of such land continuously for a period of forty years or more, during which
period no title transaction with respect to such interest
appears of record in his chain of title, and no notice has
been filed by him or on his behalf as provided in Subsection (a), and such possession continues to the time when
marketability is being determined, such period of possession shall be deemed equivalent to the filing of the notice
immediately preceding the termination of the forty-year
period described in Subsection (a).
Sections 3 and 4 have been placed together because the area they
cover in New Mexico is common-the limitation on actions by
persons under a disability. Section 23-1-10 of the New Mexico
statutes4 1 provides that minors and "persons insane or under any
legal disability" shall have one year from the termination of the
disability to commence their action, otherwise barred by some
41. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-10 (1953).
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statute of limitation. New Mexico has no general statute of limitations providing a definite period within which actions must be
brought, disability or no disability. Approximately half the states
have such acts, which set maximum periods to the duration of disability. 2 England has had such a statute limiting the period to forty
years since 1833, and in 1874 amended the statute to reduce the
period to thirty years.4 That such a limitation is reasonable, and
constitutional as an exercise of a limitation for the public welfare
seems firmly established, 44 and a forty-year period would not be
violative of New Mexico's policy or constitution. However, it
would be necessary to amend section 23-1-10 to add the words
''except as provided [in the sections of New Mexico's Marketable
Title Act] ."

Clause (b) of Section 4 will preserve to the possessor of land of
forty years' standing his interests whether or not he files a notice,
providing he is in possession at the time the marketability of title
is being determined. This is the one place in the act which requires
the examiner to determine facts extraneous to the record, and places
on him the burden of making inquiry as to present posession of the
land. The exceptional nature of this circumstance, however, would
seem to indicate that the burden is not unduly excessive, and the
protection to a long term possessor is worth it. Present possession
not consonant with the record chain of title should, in any event,
place the buyer on notice that some conflicting claim may exist.
Section 5. CONTENTS OF NOTICE AND INDEXING.
To be effective and to be entitled to record the notice
above referred to shall contain an accurate and full description of all land affected by such notice which description shall be set forth in particular terms and not by
general inclusions; but if said claim is founded upon a recorded instrument, then the description in such notice may
be the same as that contained in such recorded instrument. Such notice shall be filed for record in the [office
of the county clerk] of the county or counties where the
land described therein is situated. The [clerk] of each
county shall accept all such notices presented to him which
42. Basye, op. cit. supra note 3, § 54.
43.

Id. at n. 4.

44. Webster, supra note 4, at 115-116.

JULY, 1966"]

NO TES

describe land located in the county in which he serves
and shall enter and record full copies thereof in the same
way that deeds and other instruments are recorded and
each recorder shall be entitled to charge the same fees for
the recording thereof as are charged for recording deeds.
In indexing such notices in his office each recorder shall
enter such notices under the grantee indexes of deeds under the names of the claimants appearing in such notices.
Such notices shall also be indexed under the description of
real estate involved in a book set apart for that purpose to
be known as the "Notice Index."
The words contained in the brackets in section 5 have been inserted to accommodate the act to the New Mexico situation. Probably the most novel feature of this section is the provision in the
last paragraph for establishment by the county clerk of each county
of a "Notice Index" which shall be a tract index. Although it has
been suggested that this feature be eliminated, and reliance be made
upon the already existing grantor-grantee indexes, 45 establishment
of the tract notice index appears more desirable. The experience
of other states indicates that the number of notices filed is extremely small under a forty-year statute, and the establishment and
maintenance of the tract notice index would not be burdensome.
Additionally, the re-recording of interests such as restrictive covenants, if required to be done by determining each individual owner
in a subdivision, might be so difficult that a question of due process
would arise. By means of a "Notice Index" re-recording could be
accomplished with reasonable cost and ease.4
Section 6. INTERESTS NOT BARRED BY ACT.
This Act shall not be applied to bar any lessor or his
successor as a reversioner of his right to possession on
the expiration of any lease; or to bar or extinguish any
easement or interest in the nature of an easement, the
existence of which is clearly observable by physical evidence of its use; or to bar any right, title or interest of
the United States, by reason of failure to file the notice
herein required.
45. Id. at 116-117.
46. Perhaps, the establishment of this small tract index combined with the advances being made in technology of business machines and computers could lead to
a low-cost inclusion of tract index systems throughout each county.
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Under this section, it would be necessary for underground easements to be re-recorded within the statutory period, because the
New Mexico Supreme Court has held that underground easements
are not visible or clearly observable. An addition to section 6 is
suggested as follows:
Nor shall this act be applied to bar or extinguish any
easement or right-of-way granted for the purposes of laying and use of an underground pipeline or conduit for
transport of oil, gas, electricity, water or other commodity, so long as such pipeline or conduit is continued in
actual use and for a period of one year after discontinuance of use.
Some states, in adopting their marketable title acts, have worded
this exception to provide for continuance of easements of public
utilities, but in New Mexico where underground pipes often carry
private water, it would seem better to provide that all such underground easements be excepted as long as use can be proven,48 and
for a reasonable time after use is discontinued, to give the owner
an opportunity to record a notice if he so wishes.
Section 7. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS AND RECORDING ACTS.
Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to extend the period for the bringing of an action or for the
doing of any other required act under any statutes of
limitations, nor, except as herein specifically provided, to
affect the operation of any statutes governing the effect
of the recording or the failure to record any instrument
affecting land.
47. Southern Union Gas Co. v. Cantrell, 56 N.M. 184, 241 P.2d 1209 (1952).
48. Michigan amended its Marketable Title Act in 1965 in order to similarly provide for continuance of underground easements by adding the following words:
or to bar or extinguish any easement or interest in the nature of an easement,
or any rights appurtenant thereto granted, excepted or reserved by a recorded
instrument creating such easement or interest, including any rights for future
use, if the existence of such easement or interest is evidenced by the location
beneath, upon or above any part of the land described in such instrument
of any pipe, valve, road, wire, cable, conduit, duct, sewer, track, pole, tower,
or other physical facility and whether or not the existence of such facility is
observable.
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 26.1274 (Supp. 1965).
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Section 8. DEFINITIONS.
As used in this Act:
(a) "Marketable record title" means a title of record,
as indicated in Section 1 hereof, which operates to extinguish such interests and claims, existing prior to the effective date of the root of title, as are stated in Section
3 hereof.
(b) "Records" includes probate and other official public records, as well as records in the [office of the county
clerk].
(c) "Recording," when applied to the official public
records of a probate or other court, includes filing.
(d) "Person dealing with land" includes a purchaser of
any estate or interest therein, a mortgagee, a levying or
attaching creditor, a land contract vendee, or any other
person seeking to acquire an estate or interest therein,
or impose a lien thereon.
(e) "Root of title" means that conveyance or other
title transaction in the chain of title of a person, purporting to create the interest claimed by such person, upon
which he relies as a basis for the marketability of his title,
and which was the most recent to be recorded as of a date
forty years prior to the time when marketability is being
determined. The effective date of the "root of title" is
the date on which it is recorded.
(f) "Title transaction" means any transaction affecting
title to any interest in land, including title by will or descent, title by tax deed, or by trustee's, referees's, guardian's, executor's, administrator's, master in chancery's, or
sheriff's deed, or decree of any court, as well as warranty deed, quitclaim deed, or mortgage.
Section 9. ACT TO BE LIBERALLY
CONSTRUED.
This Act shall be liberally construed to effect the legislative purpose of simplifying and facilitating land title
transactions by allowing persons to rely on a record chain
of title as described in Section 1 of this Act, subject only
to such limitations as appear in Section 2 of this Act.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. 6

Section 10. TWO-YEAR EXTENSION OF FORTYYEAR PERIOD.
If the forty-year period specified in this Act shall have
expired prior to two years after the effective date of this
Act, such period shall be extended two years after the
effective date of this Act.
The last four sections of the Model Act are so reasonably selfexplanatory that few comments are needed. The bracketed words in
section 8 have been inserted again to adapt the act to New Mexico.
Professor Webster, in his article "The Quest for Clear Land
Titles,"4 has drafted and recommended a fairly lengthy statement
of legislative purpose in the stated belief that it will bolster judicial
opinions that the act is constitutional. It seems that such lengthy
statement is not necessary, and the brief statement contained in
section 9 is sufficiently forceful to convey the legislative message.
The two-year extension following enactment will of course delay the full operation of the act for that period following its enactment. It is essential, however, that this be done, because acts
providing for automatic extinguishment without reasonable period
being given for the filing of notice or re-recordation have been
found unconstitutional. ° Authorities are generally in agreement
that the two-year period is sufficient to be reasonable, and numerous
decisions support them.51
IV
ALTERNATIVE CONSIDERATIONS

The Model Marketable Title Act appears to be the best obtainable legislation for New Mexico to promote simplicity and economy
49. Webster, supra note 4, at 103.
50. A Kansas statute providing no period for recording notice, but requiring claimant to bring action to protect his interests within one year of passage of the act was
held invalid in Murrison v. Fenstermacher, 166 Kan. 568, 203 P.2d 160 (1949). See
also Girard Trust Co. v. Penn. R.R., 364 Pa. 576, 73 A.2d 371 (1950) ; Biltmore Village v. Royal, 71 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1954).
51. Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf, 6 11. 2d 486, 130 N.E.2d 111 (1955) ; Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957) (Nine months held to be
"reasonable" period) ; Vance v. Vance, 108 U.S. 514 (1883) (Holding that a tenmonth period in which all existing mortgages were to be recorded under a new statute was a "reasonable" period). See also Note, Constitutionality of Marketable Title
Act Legislation, 47 Iowa L.R. 413 (1962).
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in title transactions. But it is not the only solution to the problem
than can be envisioned.
The Torrens system of title registration has long been touted
by many as a far superior method of handling conveyancing problems. 2 Nineteen states have adopted the system, but two have
found it expedient to later repeal the legislation. 3 In the seventeen
states which will have a Torrens system in force, its use is optional,
and in only three states, Illonois, Massachusetts, and Minnesota,
has its use been extensive. Minnesota has probably gone further in
its use of the Torrens system than any other state, and at present
some thirty-three per cent of title transactions in Minneapolis and
St. Paul are Torrens registrations. In Duluth it has been reported
that about twenty per cent of titles are now registered, and most
quiet title actions in the state result in a registered title.5 4 It is
conceivable that if this practice is continued over a long period,
universality of the system will result in Minnesota.
There has also been interest lately in programs of computerization of real estate records, which will greatly facilitate indexing
and the extraction of abstracts of title.55 Presently, electronic data
equipment is certainly capable of handling real estate records and
indexing at great speed and with exceedingly high degree of accuracy. But standard systems of indexing must be developed, and
the cost and problems involved are now probably far beyond
the capabilities of small counties. Such conceivable improvements
would not supplant the need for a marketable title act, because the
act is directed at simplifying title examination, not the problem
of record keeping and information extraction. Computerization
of records offices would complement the act, and the two together
would go far in making title transactions simple, quick and
economical.
CONCLUSION

The discussion of a marketable title act has been limited in scope,
and little attention has been paid to the problem of constitutionality
52. E.g., Patton, The Torrens System of Land Title Registration, 19 Minn. L. Rev.
519 (1935) ; Basye, supra note 4, at 262.
53. Nebraska abolished its system in 1943, and California in 1955.
54. 1956 Proceedings, ABA, Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law,
Part II, Real Property Division, 102 (1956).
55. 1965 Proceedings, ABA, Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law,
Part II, Real Property Division, 56 (1965).
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of the act. However, there is ample support for the position that
the act is constitutional.5"
The legislation is a step toward much needed reform in conveyancing procedures. It should be considered for adoption by the
legislature of New Mexico at its next session.
JOHN N. URTES*

56. E.g., Webster, supra note 4, at 118-20; Note, 47 Iowa L. Rev. 413 (1962).
* Member, Board of Editors, 1965-66.

